

USING THE ADAPTED CITIES FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES IN SMALL U.S. MUNICIPALITIES

Robert D. Eskridge and P. Edward French*

ABSTRACT. Researchers have generally compared council-manager municipalities against mayor-council forms when seeking to measure the efficiency gains envisioned by early twentieth century reformers. Many studies have used per capita expenditure levels of municipalities as a proxy for efficiency, associating lower spending levels with greater efficiency. This study utilizes the “Adapted Cities Framework” advocated by Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004) which classifies municipalities into five, rather than two, institutional types to analyze per capita expenditure data from a national survey of 1,000 small municipalities. Using OLS regression and other statistical analyses, the authors demonstrate that there is a significant difference between the per capita expenditure levels of the five city types. As municipalities more closely conform to the pure reformed council-manager model of government, higher per capita expenditure levels are evidenced.

INTRODUCTION

The early part of the twentieth century found the reform movement in government in the United States in full swing. There was probably no level of government more dramatically affected by the progressive ideas than the local level of municipal government. The structural reform of cities from political machines of patronage

* Robert D. Eskridge, MPA, and P. Edward French, Ph.D., are a Doctoral Candidate, and Associate Professor, respectively, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Mississippi State University. Mr. Eskridge's research interests are in local government management, privatization, and ethics. Dr. French's teaching and research interests encompass local government administration, including human resource issues, emergency and risk management and selected topics in public management.

and corrupt officials was a top priority for those seeking to put business-like practices and increased efficiency into government. Reformers of the early 20th century believed that by changing the institutions of local government and looking to the corporate model for structure, they could replace the dominant system of political leadership and subgroup representation and bring efficiency and professional management to city services (Adrian, 1988). These reforms led to the implementation of the council-manager form of local government based upon a unitary council (board of directors) and an appointed professional administrator (CEO) hired to run the day to day operations. The council-manager plan was promoted because it was based on a unitary model that lessened conflict and promoted citywide interest while at the same time strengthening the chief executive (the city manager) (Svara, 1994).

Numerous studies examining the various aspects of the council-manager plan have been published since its inception. Researchers have examined the individuals who are in charge of government at the local level as well as a municipality's adoption of one form over another. In most research conducted, council-manager form municipalities have usually been contrasted against non-reformed municipalities based upon an elected Mayor performing the duties as CEO along with a separately elected council. These dichotomous comparisons have been used to assess differences in service performance levels and other interesting data. However, most of these studies have focused on cities with large populations. International City/County Management Association (ICMA) data indicates that a very large percentage of municipalities serve communities with populations between 2,500 and 25,000 (ICMA, 2009). The purpose of this research is to enhance the field's understanding of the relationship between government form and municipal expenditures in America's smaller localities.


In recent times, scholars have pointed to a convergence between the structural characteristics of the two classical and distinct forms of local government. Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004) noted that each of the two separate forms has taken on institutional attributes of the other over time until in many cases they are hard to distinguish from each other. Frederickson et al. call these "hybrid" or "adapted" cities and claimed that most U.S. municipalities fit into this category. These authors also contended that this blending of features

has lessened the diagnostic value of distinguishing between the two classical forms of mayor-council and council-manager (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004).

This study is an attempt to enhance the body of knowledge regarding adaptive cities by examining the relationship between expenditures per capita and the different forms of local government by using a system which places each city along a continuum from pure political to pure administrative. The authors seek to help answer the question of whether municipalities using the council-manager form of government are fiscally more efficient than those using the mayor-council plan.¹ The primary independent variable is the city form of government. This form of government variable has been derived by utilizing the framework developed by Frederickson et al., which categorizes five different forms of local government based on institutional characteristics. The forms are political cities, adapted political cities, conciliated cities, adapted administrative cities, and administrative cities. These authors anticipated that cities in the United States would be distributed in a bi-modal fashion and most cities would be found in the two adapted city categories (adapted political and adapted administrative). To evaluate the fiscal efficiency of a city, per capita expenditures of each municipality are evaluated while controlling for a number of substantive variables such as median income, number of services offered, whether the city is located in a rural or urban setting, and the region of the country where the municipality is located.

This research has used the individual municipality as the unit of analysis and utilized a data base developed from a survey of 1,000 small cities (between 2,500 and 25,000) in the United States. The survey responses returned by respondents were utilized to classify each municipality into one of the five categories listed above. OLS regression, ANOVA analysis, and descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data. To examine the variables that affect the efficiency of small municipalities within the United States, a single hypothesis was proposed as the primary area of interest regarding the effect of form of government on the efficiency of a municipality (efficiency measured as the amount of expenditures per capita). A diagram of the expected relationships is shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
Relationship between Form of Government and Per-Capita Expenditures



Hypothesis: Municipalities that are more reformed (administrative) will have different expenditure levels than municipalities that are less reformed (political).

LITERATURE ON STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

Over the years, scholars have examined the structure of government at the local level and attempted to evaluate whether certain structural characteristics have significant effects on the efficiency of that government (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Abney & Lauth, 1986; Rubin, 1988; Hayes & Chang 1990). Many researchers have chosen to evaluate a local government based upon whether the government was institutionalized as a council-manager or a mayor-council form of government (Sherbenau, 1961; Kessel, 1962; Schnore & Alford, 1963; Alford & Scoble, 1965; Dye & MacManus, 1976; Sanders, 1979; Farnham & Bryant, 1985; and Sharp. 1995).

ICMA identified five broad types of municipal form of government in the United States (MacManus & Bullock, 2003). These five categories include mayor-council (CEO is the chief elected official and an elected council/board serves as the legislative body); council-manager (a professional administrator is responsible to an elected council/board for day to day operations); commission (board members serve as the heads of specific departments); town meeting

(voters convene to produce basic policy and choose selectmen); and representative town meeting (voters select representatives to represent them at town meetings). According to a 2001 survey of U.S. cities conducted by ICMA, 38% of all respondent cities were mayor-council, 53% were council-manager, 1% commission form, 6% town meeting form, and 2% were representative town meeting form (MacManus & Bullock, 2003). The use in studies of the distinction of mayor-council versus council-manager form has usually eliminated those cities with other forms of government such as town meeting and commission because they either represent a particular region (town meeting governments are mainly found in New England) or represent a very small percentage of municipalities such as the commission form (1%).

The historical development of cities stems from the progressive movement of the early twentieth century. Different scholars have discussed many separate motives for the changes that took place in local government during this period. Adrian (1988) contended that the reform movement of the early 20th century was “an effort to return to the simplicity of the American colonial system, a system in which there was no separation of powers” (Adrian, 1988, p.9). Svara (1994) noted that these structural and legal changes were actually preconditions for other changes reformers desired. Problems that reformers wanted to address in this period included fragmented authority, conflict, corruption, poor service quality, and lack of competent staff. Even though these authors, as well as others such as Newland (1995) and Frederickson and Johnson (2001), envisioned multiple motives contained within the reform movement, each also acknowledges that a common theme throughout them all is the idea of efficiency.

The introduction of the city-manager form of government was intended to introduce more businesslike practices to local government and greater efficiency. It is for this reason that scholars look to evaluate whether reformed governments achieve this intended outcome. Scholars continue to debate whether council-manager governments are more efficient than mayor-council governments. Results of their research have produced conflicting viewpoints. Many of these studies have examined measures of expenditure levels within municipalities to evaluate efficiency (Stumm & Corrigan, 1998; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995).

One of the earliest of these studies was by Booms (1966). In this study of Midwestern towns, he found that the presence of a professionally trained manager led to lower municipal expenditures. Other studies, however have found the exact opposite (Nunn, 1966; Cole, 1971). The possible reason scholars have proposed for this ambiguity in results is that the manager is simply an extension of the council, serving at the pleasure of the elected body (Deno & Mehay, 1987).

Others scholars propose that studies, “ignored the broader view of local government structure beyond the question of management expertise” (Campbell & Turnbull, 2003, p. 23). Campbell and Turnbull suggested that the separation of powers exhibited in the mayor-council form of government verses the unified government found in the council-manager form might lead to the difference seen in spending levels. Jung (2006) proposed two possible reasons for the conflicting results from empirical studies. The first reason he suggested is that, “different studies use different definitions of municipal expenditures” (Jung, 2006, p. 365). He pointed out that some studies use total city expenditures and others use only expenditures for common municipal services such as police, fire, health, etc. Secondly, Jung proposed that different studies use of different statistical methods has also contributed to the confusion. Most studies have utilized single-year cross-sectional data that do not take into account the time dimension. Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) questioned whether the problem lies in how government structure itself is measured. They used local government classification structures to assess whether there was any difference in total expenditures for 263 Michigan municipalities and concluded that there was no evidence that statistically demonstrated any difference between types of government and expenditures (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2010).

Despite weaknesses, the expenditure levels found in local governments are still used to indicate efficiency in the organization in many studies. However, scholars and researchers must be very careful not to rely on spending level as the sole measure of efficiency (French, 2004; Jung, 2006). Jung reminded us of the distinction between “technical efficiency” (the input-output ratio or cost per unit of output) and “allocative efficiency” (how responsive outputs are to public preferences and needs) that Boyne (1998a; 1998b) talked

Since much of this analysis was based on the adapted cities framework developed by Frederickson et al., it was important to also develop a categorical variable for each municipality that describes that municipality as put forward in the original adapted framework model. A second variable was therefore created from the structural variables captured in the original survey. This second variable was a categorical variable created to classify each municipality into one of the original five city classification types in the adapted city framework. Although not all 15 structural characteristics included in this original framework could be captured from this data set, ten were identified from responses given (see Appendix B). These ten captured characteristics included all of those that were identified as “key” by the authors within the original adapted cities framework. This adapted cities classification scheme produced five types of municipalities based upon structural characteristics such as the presence of a hired professional Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), whether the mayor is directly elected or selected from among the council members, and whether the councilors are elected from at large within a city or are elected by district within a city. The five categories produced for city form of government include the following:

1. *Political Cities*: these cities represent the classical political extreme; they utilize a separation of powers structure with the Mayor acting as CEO and not serving on the city council.
2. *Adapted Political Cities*: these cities are most clearly distinguished from pure political cities by the presence of a professional CAO appointed by the mayor.
3. *Conciliated Cities*: these cities are no longer obviously based solely on a separation of powers model or a unity of powers model. They have a CAO that is appointed jointly by the mayor and council and the council may be elected at-large or by district in the city.
4. *Adapted Administrative Cities*: these cities are usually distinguished from pure administrative cities in that the mayor is directly elected, may have the veto, may be full-time, and may have additional input into the manager’s appointment.
5. *Administrative Cities*: these cities represent the classical council-manager unity-of-power form. The mayor is a member of council with no separate executive duties and is appointed from among the council. Council is part-time and is elected at-large in the city. Council terms are usually short (2 year terms).

Both the continuous variable and the categorical variable were the primary independent variables used in analysis of the data for this study.

The primary dependent variable for this research is the reported net per capita expenditures for each city. This variable is calculated by dividing the total expenditures of each municipality by the reported population for that municipality. Since public education usually falls under a separate jurisdiction than does the local municipality, education spending was excluded from total expenditures if it was noted by a municipality. Thus the analysis had increased focus on common city government functions. In the regression model, several other factors that could possibly have an effect on the total expenditure level of a municipality were used as control variables including the median household income reported for the city and the total number of common services that the city performs.⁵ Dummy variables were also included to identify whether the city was located in an urban or rural area and to identify the region of the country in which the city was located. Statistical tests revealed 19 municipalities that were significant outliers.⁶ These 19 cases were removed from the data set. VIF tests showed no multicollinearity in the regression model.

DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics for the 529 municipalities in the data set are shown in Table 1. The majority of these small municipalities are “adapted administrative” type cities (40.5%) and this holds true in every region of the country. Political cities come in a distant second in frequency (at 23.6%). Overall, the mean per capita expenditure is \$985. Political cities have the lowest per capita expenditures (\$824), and administrative cities have the highest (\$1,120). The northeast region has the lowest overall per capita expenditure levels of the four regions (\$830); almost 16% below the overall mean expenditure level of \$985. Across all regions and types, adapted administrative cities in the west have the highest per capita expenditures (\$1,333) and political cities in the south have the lowest (\$688). Interestingly, the south region has the highest percentage of both political cities (27.8%) and adapted administrative cities (43.7%). The west region

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of Municipalities

		Pure Pol.	Adapt Pol.	Concil.	Adapted Admin	Admin	Totals
Number of Municipalities		125	119	15	214	56	529
		23.6%	22.5%	2.8%	40.5%	10.6%	
Per-Capita Expenditure Mean		\$824	\$896	\$860	\$1,101	\$1,120	\$985
Urban		8.2%	9.1%	1.3%	19.1%	5.0%	100%
Rural		15.6%	13.2%	1.6%	20.9%	5.9%	
Number of Cities by Region	North-east	26.7%	22.2%	1.5%	40.7%	8.9%	135
	South	27.8%	16.6%	4.0%	43.7%	7.9%	151
	Mid west	21.0%	25.0%	3.2%	41.9%	8.9%	124
	West	17.6%	27.7%	2.5%	34.5%	17.6%	119
Per-Capita Exp. Mean by Region	Northeast	\$885	\$680	\$907	\$833	\$1,014	\$830
	South	\$688	\$809	\$925	\$1,190	\$1,059	\$966
	Mid west	\$939	\$1,105	\$613	\$1,090	\$1,218	\$1,058
	West	\$850	\$963	\$1,031	\$1,333	\$1,166	\$1,108

has the lowest percentage of political cities (17.6%) and the highest percentage of administrative cities (17.6%).

Next, an OLS regression of the score that was calculated earlier (0-44 with zero representing the most political structure and 44 the most administrative structure) was run against the per capita expenditure. A Breush-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity indicated a problem with the original model so a robust regression was used to correct for this problem. Model 1 shown below in Table 3 represents the original robust model and in Model 2 (also shown in Table 3 below) the nineteen outliers discussed previously are removed. The northeast region was used as the intercept dummy variable and the models included dummy variables for the other three regions of the country. Median income of the community (reported by the municipality) was controlled for as was the number of services offered (the number of services that the city reported as made available) and whether the city was located in a rural or urban area

(0=urban; 1=rural). Since all municipalities did not provide information for all of the needed variables (primarily omitting the median income figure), the number of cases was reduced from 529 to 405. The regression output is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
Estimated Effects of City Characteristics on City Per Capita Expenditures

	Model 1	Model 2
N size	423	405
Independent Variables:		
Political Structure Score	10.10** (3.51)	7.01** (3.55)
Rural or Urban (rural = 1)	178.68* (1.93)	155.41** (2.36)
West Region	462.61** (3.99)	207.75** (2.58)
South Region	141.03* (1.71)	148.17** (2.03)
Mid-West Region	367.52** (3.66)	245.77** (3.18)
Number of Services Offered	10.69 (0.57)	12.27 (0.92)
Median Household Income	0.003** (1.08)	0.005** (3.05)
Intercept	300.33 (1.20)	265.41 (1.43)
Adjusted R Square	0.09	0.08
F Score	5.98	4.80
Model Prob > F	>.001**	>.001**

The political structural score (that measures how political or administrative a city's structural characteristics rate on the continuum in Figure 2) is statistically significant at the .001 level (t score of 3.55). In Model 2 the only variable that is not statistically significant is the one controlling for the number of services offered by the city. The overall model is found to be significant with an F score probability of less than .001. The R² is .08 indicating that only 8% of

the variation seen in the data regarding expenditures is explained using this model⁷. A one-way ANOVA analysis was used to determine if there is a significant difference between the per capita expenditure means between the five forms of government as described. This analysis produced an $F(3,525) = 5.07$, $p < 0.001$ indicating that there is a significant difference between the mean per capita expenditures of these five types of government. A Bonferroni comparison test confirms a significant difference between political and adapted administrative cities, political and administrative cities, and adapted political and adapted administrative cities.

ANOVA was again utilized to determine if a statistically significant difference exists between the four regions of the country and the means of city per capita expenditures. This analysis produces an $F(4,524) = 5.56$, $p < 0.01$ indicating that there is a significant difference between the mean per capita expenditures between these four regions of the country. The Bonferroni comparison test reveals significant differences between the Northeast and Mid-West regions and between the Northeast and West regions.

When each region was examined individually, only a significant difference between the per capita expenditure means of city types located within the South region was indicated ($F(4,146) = 4.97$, $p < 0.01$). An ANOVA analysis performed between the five types of government and the number of services offered by each of those types showed no significant difference in the five categories [$F(4,536) = .62$, $p = .65$].

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Frederickson et al. (2004) proposed that the five types of cities would be distributed in a bi-modal fashion with the two adapted categories containing the largest number of cities. The analysis in this study shows this to be true in part for cities with populations between 2,500 and 25,000. While the adapted administrative category contains the largest number of small U.S. cities in this survey (40.5%), the second largest group of small cities is found in the political category (23.6%), not in the adapted political category (22.5%) as would be anticipated by the adapted cities framework. This observation is also evidenced in the Northeast and South regions of the country. In the Midwest and West the majority of the cities responding to this survey can be classified as adaptive types. Results

for the Frederickson et al. (2004) survey and the Carr and Karuppusamy (2008) survey used to classify cities by the adapted cities framework are compared with this analysis (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
Comparison of Related Studies

	N	Pure Pol.	Adapt Pol.	Concil.	Adapt Admin.	Pure Admin
Small Cities Survey	529	23.6%	22.5%	2.8%	40.5%	10.6%
Frederickson Survey	119	16.4%	16.4%	12.9%	39.7%	14.7%
Carr Survey	263	3.0%	2.3%	30.8%	35.0%	28.9%

The study of 263 Michigan cities by Carr and Karuppusamy (2009) produced some very different results in several categories. These authors suggested that the inclusion of smaller population municipalities in their study might account for the differences between their findings and the original Frederickson et al. study of 119 cities. Since our study includes only municipalities between 2,500 and 25,000 in population, the Carr and Karuppusamy study population might be more diverse, which could explain some of the differences seen in the classification results. That the current study captures only 10 of the original structural features of the adapted city framework may also explain some of the variation. Differences may also be attributed to a national study verses a state specific (Michigan) study of municipalities.

In summary, this analysis indicates that there is a significant difference between the forms of government as defined using the adapted cities framework and the per capita expenditures of those cities. Using the form of government variable that scored each city from most political (0) to those most administrative (44), the OLS regression analysis indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between how administrative a municipality scores and how much that municipality spends per capita. While this relationship is statistically significant, thus confirming the hypothesis, the direction of this relationship, however, is opposite of what was originally anticipated. This study had anticipated that as a city adopted more characteristics of reformed cities, the efficiency of the city (measured by the per capita expenditures) would improve (per

capita spending would decrease). But, the data indicates that cities which are more administrative actually have higher per capita expenditures. The ANOVA analysis confirmed that there is a significant difference overall between the five adapted cities forms of government and how much these cities spend per capita ($F(3,525)=5.07, p < 0.001$).

Regional differences are also evidenced. ANOVA analysis demonstrated a significant difference between the mean per capita expenditure levels between the four different regions of the country ($F(4,524)=5.56, p < 0.01$). Particular significance can be found between the Northeast region and both the Midwest region ($p < .05$) and the West region ($p < .01$). ANOVA analysis also indicates that there is a significant difference between the median family income of small municipalities in the four different regions of the country ($3,437 = 5.3, p < 0.01$).

The OLS robust regression indicates that median income of the municipality, whether the city is located in a rural or urban area, and how the city scores on the political-administrative continuum each have significant relationships to the per capita expenditure of that city. Only the variable that captured the number of services offered by the municipality did not show a significant relationship in the model. The model explains only 8% of the change in per capita expenditures, but it is significant statistically [$F(7,397) = 5.56, p < 0.001$].

CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that a significant difference exists between small municipalities' per capita expenditure levels when the adapted cities framework is used to distinguish between city forms of government. The more administrative a city scores on the political / administrative continuum, the higher the per capita expenditure is likely to become. This analysis also indicates that there is no significant difference in the number of services that are offered by the five types of city forms under the adapted cities framework. There are significant differences however, between regions of the country when evaluating per capita expenditures and median household income. In their study of Michigan cities, Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) did not find any evidence that the structure of a local government was statistically related to the per capita expenditures of

that city. Based on our study of small municipalities in the U.S., evidence of this relationship does exist; however, only a small percent of the variation (8%) is explained using this model. This low explanatory value, while significant, encourages future research evaluating other factors which significantly influence per capita municipal expenditure levels through form of government including service provision and performance. There are several key aspects regarding small municipal governments and the services they provide which have yet to be fully examined in the public administration research literature, including demographic trends, structural features, and executive management of small communities. The value added to small municipalities of having a professional manager or CAO may significantly emerge with respect to the level of involvement of these individuals in the various dimensions of the governmental process, their broader pattern of consultation in making decisions, their level of responsiveness to community interest, and the level of input service quality provided by small communities (Folz & French, 2005).

Many studies including this research comparing the efficiency of the two forms as measured by lower city expenditure levels have produced mixed results. The utilization of the per capita expenditure variable as an efficiency measure is troublesome as municipalities vary regarding the various categories of expenditures designated in their budgets. Future research may benefit from the assessment of the relationships between form of government and efficiency measures such as unit cost, cost per full-time equivalent, or some other measurement representing the amount of work performed per unit of resource input. We agree with Carr and Karuppusamy that additional research needs to be performed using the adapted cities framework to assist as a guide in understanding the various characteristics of municipalities in many different policy study areas. Much of the past research has evaluated local government from a dichotomous view. Incorporation of a more comprehensive framework should enhance overall understanding of the differences in local government forms.

NOTES

1. The relationship between form of government and municipal expenditures is not clearly established by the existing literature. Some authors have shown that council-manager cities spend less

than cities with non-council-manager forms of government (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Clark, 1968; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). Other scholars contend that council-manager municipalities exhibit higher per capita expenditure levels (Sherbenou, 1961; Nunn, 1996; Cole, 1971). Yet, the majority of research has shown that no significant relationship between form of government and municipal expenditure levels exists; therefore, variations seen in local government spending have been attributable to other factors such as region, population, functional responsibility, or socioeconomic characteristics (Liebert, 1974; Lyons & Morgan, 1977; Dye & Garcia, 1978; Meier, 1980; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980; Farnham, 1986; Wish, 1986; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Watson, 1995).

2. Other scholars have evaluated other determinates for expenditures such as Liebert (1974,1976) who found that expenditures represent both, “the degree of functional inclusiveness and the level of municipal performance in the provision of the service” (1974, p. 770). In this study we examined the structural features of the local government institution.
3. Hawaii was excluded from the survey because it contained only two ICMA recognized cities, both of which were outside the population range of this survey.
4. In order to maintain the distinction between municipalities operating under the mayor-council and council-manager form of government, two types of conciliated municipalities are recognized (political and administrative) as suggested by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008). Both are combined for the categorical variable analysis in order to evaluate survey results based on the framework developed by Frederickson et al.
5. The list of common services listed in this survey included the following: health, garbage collection, water, sewage, public transportation, education, parks and recreation, libraries, cultural activities, police, fire, and public housing.
6. Tests for the presence of outliers included leverage-hat, studentized residual, Cooks D, and DFITS.

7. A correlation matrix indicated Pearson's R score that ranged from a low of .0143 for number of services to a high of .2011 for the political/administrative score variable. The west region and score variables were found to be statistically significant.

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APPENDIX A
Calculated Scores for Atypical City Classifications Scale

		Political	Adapted Political	Political Conciliated	Admin. Conciliated	Adapted Admin.	Admin.
A	City Form	Non	Non	Non	C-M	C-M	C-M
1	Council-Manager form				19	19	19
2	Non C-M Form	0	0	0			
B	CAO Allowed/ Appt.	No	Yes	Yes	By Mayor	With Council	By Council
3	CAO allowed	0	0	0			
4	CAO Appt by Mayor		2		2		
5	Appt W/ Council			4		4	
6	Council Appts						6
C	Mayor Attributes	FT - Direct	FT - Direct	Either	FT - Direct	FT - Direct	PT By Council
9	Full time	0	0		0	0	
10	Part time			3			3
11	Direct Election	0	0		0	0	
12	Appoint by Council			3			3
D	Council Attributes	FT - District	FT - Either	FT or PT - at Large	Either	PT - Either	PT - At Large
15	Elect. By Districts	0	0		0	0	
16	Elect by Other Method			3			3
E	Mayor on Council	No	No	Yes or No	Either	Yes	Yes
17	Not on Council	0	0				3
18	On Council			3		3	3
F	Mayor Veto	Yes	Yes	May-be	Yes	Maybe	No
19	Has Veto	0	0		0	0	
20	No Veto			1			1

APPENDIX A (Continued)

		Political	Adapted Political	Political Conciliated	Admin. Conciliated	Adapted Admin.	Admin.
G	Term Length	4 year	4 year	< 4 year	4 year	mixed	< 4 year
21	Mayor 4 years	0	0		0		
22	Mayor LT 4 years			1		1	1
23	Council 4 years	0	0		0		
24	Council LT 4 years			1			1
J	Appointments of Key Officials	Mayor	M & C	M & CAO	Share	Share	CAO
29	Mayor Appoints most	0					
30	Mayor/ Council Share		1		1		
31	CAO & Council share			2		2	
32	CAO appoints						3
K	Council Size	large	large	small	small	small	small
33	Large (7 or more)	0	0				
34	Small			1	1	1	1
Total Points For Pure Types		0	3	22	23	30	44

Scale



APPENDIX B

Structural Characteristics from the Adapted Cities Framework

	Found in Dataset?	Attribute	Political	Adapted Political	Conciliated	Adapted Admin.	Admin.
KEY	YES	How Mayor is Elected?	Direct	Direct	Either	Direct	At Large
KEY	YES	How is Most Council Elected?	District	Either	Either	Either	Most are At Large
KEY	YES	Is CAO Present?	No	Likely	Yes	Yes	Yes
KEY	YES	Mayor on Council?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
	YES	Mayor Have Veto?	Yes	Yes	Maybe	No	No
	YES	Mayor - FT or PT?	FT	FT	Either	Usually PT	PT
	NO	Mayor has Staff?	Yes	Yes	Maybe	No	No
	NO	Council FT or PT?	FT	Either	Either	PT	PT

APPENDIX B (Continued)

	Found in Dataset?	Attribute	Political	Adapted Political	Conciliated	Adapted Admin.	Admin.
	NO	Council has Staff?	Yes	Maybe	No	No	No
	YES	Elect ion Partisan?	Either	Either	Either	Usually No	No
	YES	Who do Dept Heads Report to?	Mayor	Mayor	CAO	CAO	CAO
	YES	Who Appoints the CAO?	NA	Mayor	Mayor with Council Consent	Council	Council
	NO	Presence of Civil Service?	Maybe	Maybe	Usually	Usually	Usually
	NO	Presence of a Bidding System?	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
KEY	YES	Statutory Form?	Mayor-Council	Likely Mayor-Council	Either	Likely Council-Manager	Council-Manager